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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect of a unilateral transfer 
on the welfare of two countries under uncertainty. The traditional 
welfare effects are summarized and extended for a pure exchange economy 
with complete contingent claims markets. It is demonstrated that the 
effects of a transfer in such an economy is isomorphic to the 
effects in the traditional certainty case where a unilateral transfer 
always decreases the welfare of the transferor and increases that 
of the transferee. Further, in the absence of a complete set of 
markets, examples are exhibited in which a unilateral transfer 
increases the welfare of both countries. 
THE TRANSFER PROBLEM UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
THE EXISTENCE OF PARETO-IMPROVING TRANSFERS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Upon conclusion of the first World War, economists discussed 
the effects of a unilateral transfer -- such as German war reparations 
on the terms of trade. It was argued that any increase in unilateral 
payments would most likely shift the terms of trade against the paying 
country, and that any reduction in its unilateral payments would probably 
shift the terms of trade in its favor.1
Jones [1970] suggested that at the initial prices the real 
income loss represented by the transfer, the "primary" effect, might 
well be mitigated by the "secondary" effect of an improvement in 
the terms of trade in favor of the transferring country. Even in 'this 
case, however, it was recognized that though the secondary effect may 
indeed mitigate the income loss due to the transfer, the change in 
the terms of trade could not compensate for the full loss of real 
income.2
Under uncertainty, the effect of a transfer is not as 
clear. Fries [1979] has examined a model in which a finite number of 
"states of nature" may occur at the end of the period, but prior to 
discovering which state of nature has resulted, the two countries may 
2 
trade securities at the beginning of the period. The existence of 
these trading opportunities permits both countries to shift their 
future income, at least partially, across the states of nature. 
When a transfer payment is made, the two countries will alter their 
portfolio holdings in such a way that the transferee's terms of trade 
may worsen in some states of nature, but improve in others. Fries 
has included production in his model and by concentrating solely on 
this "secondary" effect has left unanswered the question of whether 
or not the change in the terms of trade will ever dominate the initial 
loss in the paying country's real income due to the transfer under 
uncertainty. 
In this paper we will concentrate on a pure exchange economy. 
This is because there currently does not exist a general theory of 
producer behavior when markets are incomplete. Further, since 
production in models with incomplete markets may lead to further 
inefficiences, we wish to examine cases in which one "rational 
expectations.equilibrium" (before a transfer) is Pareto dominated by 
another "rational expectations equilibrium" (after a transfer) even 
when there is no production. 
Employing a model of trade under uncertainty we will examine 
We the effect of the transfer on the welfare of the two countries. 
will show that given a complete contingent claims market the 
effect of a transfer will be to decrease the transferor's welfare 
and increase the transferee's welfare, regardless of the shift in the 
terms of trade, so long as the determinant of the Jacobian of excess 
supply functions is positive. In the usual two commodity model, 
this condition requires that the demand for the nonnumeraire commodity 
3 
is a decreasing function of the relative price. 
If, however, a complete contingent claims market does not 
exist, we will exhibit examples in which the transferor's initial 
welfare loss may be more than offset by the change in terms of 
trade across states of nature.3 Furthermore, it will be demonstrated
that there may exist Pareto-improving transfers which increase the 
welfare of both countries as a result of the presence of security 
markets which enables a new equilibrium to be reached in which a 
more desirable distribution of income across states of nature can 
be attained. 
Examples to follow will demonstrate that the welfare of 
the transferor may be increased in two instances. The first such 
example suggests that the effect of a transfer can be isomorphic to 
the opening of additional markets, and as such may improve the welfare 
of both countries by expanding trade opportunities. The second example 
reflects upon the fact that in economies with an incomplete set of 
markets, multiple equilibria are likely to exist. In these cases 
there may well exist equilibria which improve the welfare of the 
transferor relative to some of the equilibria which were attainable 
prior to the transfer. Further, there may also exist transfers such 
that the welfare of both countries may be improved. 
II. A MODEL WITH COMPLETE CONTINGENT CLAIMS MARKETS
Consider a two-country model and suppose there are two 
goods, x(s) = (x1 (s), x2 (s))s R!, and that there is one period at the
end of which S distinct states of the world may occur, s = l, ... ,S. 
We shall refer to country 1 as the home country and country 2 as the foreign 
country. Each country will be assumed to have preferences over 
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consumption at the end of the period which are representable by the 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions Vi R! ->- R, i 1,2. 
It will be assumed that each utility function is concave and twice 
differentiable. 
Suppose further that each country receives an endowment of 
goods upon conclusion of the period in each state s, wi(s) 
i 
(w1 (s),
w� (s)) £ R�. The home country will be assumed to transfer a quantity of
good 1 to the foreign country at the end of the period in state S. 
We shall designate this transfer as At1 (s) 
2 -At (s).
Now, taking good 1 in each state as the numeraire commodity, 
we assume that each country acts to 
maximize 
i ixl' x2
subject to 
EVi 
t i i i iL TI (s)V (x1 (s), x2 (s))
s 
i i i i i x1 (s) + p (s)x2(s) � w1 (s) + p (s)w2 (s) + A t (s)
s = 1, . . . ,s. 
(1) 
where Tii(s) is country i's subjective probability distribution on
states of the world s =  l, • • .  ,S, and p (s) g R+ is the terms of trade 
expressed as the ratio of the price of good 2 to good 1 in state s. 
It is easily discernable that the maximization problem (1) for all 
states simultaneously may be decomposed into S separate problems in 
which each utility function, Vi (•), is maximized for each of the s
states independently. Thus, conditional upon the occurrence of any 
state, s, this model is identical to the usual certainty model. 
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Now assume· that at the initiation of the trading period 
there exists pre-state contingent claims markets for both goods in 
all states s = l, . ..  ,S. Further, assume there are post-state 
spot markets for all states, and that no other securities exist. 
This regime is the familiar Arrow-Debreu system of complete contingent 
markets. The equivalence .of such complete contingent markets with the 
traditional certainty structures with 2S commodities will enable us 
to derive results for the uncertainty case similar to those discussed 
in the previous section for the traditional certainty case. Let 
2 q(s) £ R
+ 
be the prices in the pre-state market contingent on
. i i i 2 state s. Define z (s) = (z1 (s), z2 (s)) £ R as the amount of goods 1 
and 2, respectively, purchased by country i in the pre-state markets for
delivery if state s occurs. 
We will assume the existence of a rational expectations 
equilibrium which is defined formally as a set of spot prices 
p (s), s = l, • • •  , S, contingent prices, q (s), s = l, • • •  , S, and a 
set of individual consumption and contingent trades (xi, zi) such
that 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
. 
i l x:(s) = l w.(s)
i J i J 
for each j = 1,2, s = 1, • • .  ,S; 
l z� (s) = 0
i J 
for each j = 1,2, s = l, • • •  ,S; 
i i For each i, ( (x (s), s = l, . • .  ,S), (z ))
maximizes EVi = l i i i TI (s)V (x (s)) 
i i s x ' z 
(2) 
subject to the budget constraints: 
i i i i i
�(s) + p(s)x2(s) � w1(s) + p(s)w2(s) + z1 (s)
I
j 
. i i + p(s)z2(s) + At (s)
L q. (s)z�(s) � O 
s J J 
xi(s) > 0 s = l, • • •  ,s. 
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In the Arrow-Debreu theory of general equilibrium, it is 
assumed that markets exist for current goods and also for contingent 
futures goods. Under this assumption, and assuming no transaction 
costs, all economic decisions may be made at one tillle and markets 
need open only once. In this case, the budget constraints in the 
maximization problem (2) may be combined into the single constraint 
Isr1(s)�(s) + Isr2(s)x;(s)
� i i � i 
lsrl (s) {w1 (s) + At (s)} + lsr2 (s)w2 (s) (3) 
where r
1(s) = q(s) and r2
(s) = q(s)p(s) are the contingent claim prices.4
To find the welfare effects of the transfer, we differentiate 
each country's expected utility function in equilibrium with respect 
to A. Employing the envelope theorem, and evaluating the derivative 
at A = 0 gives 
7 
ilEVi ;a A I A=O 
. i 
µi {L(xl Cs)s 
i 
w1 (s))ilr1 (s)/aA +
. i 
I<x�(s) - w2Cs))ilr2(s)/ilA
s 
+ Ir1(s)t
i
(s)}
s 
where µ
i is the marginal utility of income of country i.
In the appendix we prove the following proposition: 
that if complete contingent claims markets exist and if, in 
equilibrium, the determinant of the Jacobian of excess supply 
(4) 
functions is positive, then any transfer decreases the welfare of 
the transferor and increases the welfare of the transferee. This 
proposition demonstrates that a transfer under uncertainty 
in a traditional Arrow-Debreu system of complete contingent 
claims markets is similar to a transfer under certainty in that 
the "primary" welfare loss due to transfer indeed dominates 
the "secondary" effects of a change in the terms of trade. 
To illustrate this proposition we provide the 
following example which will also form a basis for the 
other examples to be constructed in the remainder of the paper. 
Example 1 
Suppose there are two goods, x
1 
and x2, and that there
8 
is one period at the end of which two distinct states of the world 
may occur. Assume that a complete set of contingent claim markets 
exist at the beginning of the period. Assume further that the home 
and foreign countries' preferences are represented by the following 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions; 
v1 
v2
1 13/4 log x1 + 3/2 log x2
2 2 3/2 log x1 + 3/4 log x2•
Each country shares the belief that state one will occur with 
probability 2/3 and that state two will occur with probability 1/3 
so that the expected utility functions are; 
1 1 1 1 EV = 2/3(3/4 log x1(1) + 3/2 log x2(1)) + 1/3(3/4 log � (2)
2 
+ 3/2 log x2(2))
2 2 2 2 EV = 2/3(3/2 log x1(1) + 3/4 log x2(1)) + 1/3(3/2 log x1 (2)
2 
+ 3/4 log x2(2)).
Upon the occurrence of state one the home country will receive 
1 the endowment represented by the vector w (1) = (90, 40). If state
2 
two occurs the home country receives the endowment vector w (2) = (90, 10).
The foreign country's endowment vectors are given by w2(1) = (30, 80)
2 and w (2) = (30, 110). With complete contingent claims markets the home 
country maximizes Ev1 subject to
1 1 1 1 r1(l)x1(1) + r2(l)x2(1) + r1(2)�(2) + r2(2)x2(2)
� 90r1 (1) + 40r2(1) + 90r1(2) + 10r2(2)
x(l), x(2) � 0
and the foreign country maximizes EV2 subject to
2 2 2 2 r1(l)x1(1) + r2(l)x2(1) + r1(2)x1(2) + r2(2)x2(2)
� 30r1(1) + 80r2(1) + 30r1(2) + 110r2(2)
x2(1), x2(2) > O.
The equilibrium.market-clearing conditions are 
1 2 
�(s) + �(s) = 120 for h = 1,2 and s = 1,2. 
It is easy to show that the solution to this equilibrium is 
r
1
(1) = r2(1) = l; r1 (2) = r2(2)
2 2 x (1) = x (2) = (80, 40)
1 1 1/2; x (1) = x (2) 
and since the utility functions give rise to demand functions 
satisfying the gross substitutes assumption, this equilibrium is 
unique. Further, solving for p(l) and p(2) gives p(l) = p(2) = 
9 
(40, 80)' 
(1, 1). In equilibrium, the value of each country's utility function 
is 
10 
Ev1 Ev2 3/4 log 40 + 3/2 log 80 9.3397. 
It may also be readily verified that, in equilibrium, the determinant 
of the Jacobian of the excess supply functions is positive. 
Now suppose the home country transfers five units of good 
1 in state 1 to the foreign country. Thus, the problem remains the 
same as that given above except that the home country's endowment 
vector in state 1 is now w
1(1) = (85, 40) and the foreign country's
endowment vector in state 1 becomes w
2(1) = (35, 80). Setting up
and solving the problem as before yields 
x1 c1>
and 
r
1 (1)
x1 (2) (2440 2440 ) x2(1) � ·  31 • x2 (2) =(5120 1280) 63 , 31 
62
1, r2(1) = 63
, r
1
(2)
31 1/2, r2(2) = 63 
• 
Solving for the terms of trade, p(l) and p(2), gives p(l) = p(2)= (1, �;), 
and the value of the home and foreign countries' utility functions
 
in equilibrium are 
Ev1 9.2911 and Ev2 9. 3872.
Thus, as was to be shown, after the transfer the welfare of the home 
country decreases while the welfare of the foreign country increases. 
III. A MODEL WITH SECURITIES MARKETS
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It has been shown thus far that the effects of a transfer 
in a complete contingent market is isomorphic to the effects of 
a transfer in the traditional certainty market with ZS commodities. 
However, in the real world few markets for contingent futures goods 
exist at any one time, and markets for such goods often reopen many 
times. Two main approaches reflecting the incomplete and sequential 
aspects of real world trading have been taken: the temporary 
equilibrium approach5 and the rational expectations approach. The
rational expectations approach regards expectations of future prices 
as variables and investigates whether there exists a set of current 
prices and expected prices such that all markets, both current and 
6future, are cleared. 
Consider now a securities regime where at the initiation 
of the trading period there exists H securities over which each 
h 
country may trade. Each security, h, returns an amount a . (s) of
J 
good j if state of the world s occurs. Let Ah represent the S x 2
matrix of returns, a�(s), from the securities.
J 
As in the traditional certainty model, we wish to examine 
the effect of the transfer upon the terms of trade, p(s) in each 
state s =  l, • • •  ,S. In the model presented here, however, the terms 
of trade play an additional role; namely they determine the monetary 
returns, 
a.h (s) 
h h 
a1(s) + p(s)a2(s)
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from security h in state s. In turn, these monetary returns define 
each country's ability to shift its income across states of nature. 
The assumption of rational expectations implies that both 
countries have "correct" self-fulfilling expectations with regard 
to the equilibrium distribution of prices which will prevail. 
Formally, a rational expectations equilibrium is defined as a set of 
spot prices, p(s), s = l, • • •  S, security prices, qh, h = l, • • •  H
i consumption vectors, x (s), s = l, . • •  ,S, i = 1,2, and vectors of
portfolio holdings z!. i = 1,2 such that 
Ixi(s)
i 
Izih
i 
0 
Iwi(s) for every s
i 
for every h 
1, ... ,s 
1, • • •  H. 
ih
For each i = 1,2 {(xi(s), s = l, • • •  S)(z , h = l, • • •  ,H)}
i � i i i . 
maximizes EV = l rr (s)U (x (s)) subJect to the budget constraints s 
i i i i h ih i x2(s) + p(s) �(s) .::_ p(s) w1(s) + w2(s) +I a (s)z +At (s)
I qhzih < o. h -
h 
We will not consider the existence of a rational expectation 
equilibrium here. Hart [1975] has previously provided an example 
of nonexistence in this framework. Radner [1972] shows that existence 
can be assured in this model if security trading plans are constrained 
to satisfy 
ih < L, i z - 1,2, h 1, • . .  ,H 
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where L is a fixed positive number. The difficulty with imposing 
such a constraint is that the choice of L is arbitrary and the 
equilibrium will in general depend upon L. Following Hart, we 
will not impose a constraint on security plans and note that the 
equilibrium defined here may not exist. Thus, the results obtained 
here will not be a consequence of imposing an artificial constraint 
but instead will follow from the market sturctures we impose. 
There are two types of market structures which will 
lead to "unorthodox effects" as a result of a transfer. Both result 
from the effect of the terms of trade on the vectors of monetary 
returns present in the economy. In the first type of structure we 
wish to examine, the effect of the transfer is that it shifts the 
terms of trade in such a way as to change the number of linearly 
independent vectors of monetary returns. By doing so, both countries 
ability to trade income across states of nature are altered and 
as such it is possible tha.t the total effect of a transfer may 
either increase or decrease the welfare of both countries. We now 
demonstrate this by means of the following example. 
Example 2 
The following example is identical to Example 1, except 
that we replace the contingent claims market with a securities 
market. Assume that there are two securities available at the 
beginning of the period with return structures represented by 
[ 20 20 lAl = and 20 20 
and possessing monetary returns 
a.2 = 
[20(1 + .,(l))l
20(1 + p2(2)) 
[ 290 18]
A2 = 7 
164 36 7 
2 
[
 
2
;
0 +18.,(1)]
and a. = 164 + 36 (2) • 7 P2 
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If the vectors of monetary returns are linearly independent 
then the market structure is equivalent to one with a complete 
contingent claims market. From Example 1, however, we know that 
in this case p(l) = p(2) = 1 and thus 
•' -[ ::] and a.2 [416 ] 4�6 • 
Since these are linearly dependent, a complete market equilibrium 
does not exist. 
Alternatively, if the vectors of monetary retu
rns are linearly
dependent, then the market structure is equi
valent to one with .!!£_ 
contingent claims market. Thus there is no way
 of trading wealth in
state 1 for wealth in state 2 and we may a
ssume without loss of
generality that no trading takes place at the
 beginning of the 
period. 
If state 1 occurs at the end of the period, the home 
country maximizes 3/4 log xi(l) + 3/2 log x�(l) subject to 
1 1 p(l) • x (1) � 90pl (1) + 40p2(1), x (1) � 0,
and the foreign country maximizes 3/2 log xi(l) + 3/4 log x;(l) 
subject to 
2 2 p(l) • x (1) � 30pl (1) + 80p2(1), x (1) � o.
15 
The equilibrium condition is �(l) + �(l) = 120 for h = 1,2 and the 
unique equilibrium is given by x1(1) = (44, 1��0), x2(1) = (76, ��O) 
and p(l) = (1, ;�). 
If state 2 occurs, the home country maximizes 3/4 log xi<2) 
+ 3/2 log x�(2) subject to 
p(2) • x1(2) � 90p1 (2) + 10p2(2), x
1(2) � 0
2 2 and the foreign country maximizes 3/2 log x1 (2) + 3/4 log x2(2) 
subject to 
p(2) • x2(2) � 30p1(2) + 110p2(2), x
2
(2) � 0.
The equilibrium condition is �(2) + �(2) 120 for h = 1,2 and 
16 
the unique equilibrium is given by x1(2) (
760 1520) 2(2)= (
2000 !QQQ.)
23 ' 21 ' 
x 23 ' 21 
and p(2) = (1, ;�). 
c::.1 
It follows that the 100netary returns are, 
[.;] 
and 
2
Cl. 
r 4223] 
l 70 9064 161 
1 70 2 
and since a. = 103 
a. the 100netary return vectors have remained
linearly dependent. Thus, this is the only equilibrium before the 
transfer, and in equilibrium, the values of the utility functions 
of the two countries are given by 
EV1
and 
EV2 
1760 760 . 560 
1/2 log 44 + log ""2T"" + 1/4 log "23"'" + 1/2 log "13" = 9.0766
760 2000 1000 
log 76 + 1/2 log """21"" + 1/2 log�+ 1/4 log ""2T"" = 9. 3236.
As in Example 1, suppose the home country transfers 5 
units of good 1 in state 1 to the foreign country. We wish to 
show that the welfare of both countries is increased. The problem 
remains the same as that above except that the home country's 
endowment vector in state 1 is now w(l) = (85, 40) and the foreign 
2 
country's endowment vector in state 1 becomes w (1) = (35,80).
(5) 
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Assuming that the vectors of monetary returns are linearly dependent 
we may set up and solve the problems as before. This yields the 
solution 
x1(1) (42, 3t�o), x2(1) (1s, 1��0), p(l) (1, i�). 
1(2) = (
760 1520) 2(2) = ( 2000 1000) (2) = (1 21) x 23 ' 21 ' x 23 ' 21 ' p ' 23 '
so that the vector of monetary returns are 
Cl.l
[��o] 
and 
2
Cl. 
[�]
140 
9064 
161 
and it may be verified that these two vectors are linearly independent 
so that this equilibrium will not exist. 
Alternatively, if the vectors of monetary returns are 
linearly independent then the market structure is equivalent to one 
with a complete contingent claims market. From Example 1, we know 
that p(l) = p(2) = (1, �;) so that 
1
Cl. 
[2��0 ] 
2500 
63
and 
2
Cl. 
[4�;6 ] 
3708
63
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and it may be verified that these two vectors are linearly independent. 
Thus, from Example 1,
Ev1 9.2911 and Ev2 9.3872. (6) 
Comparing the value of the utility functions in equation 
(6) in equilibrium after the transfer, with the value of the utility 
functions in equation (5) in equilibrium prior to the transfer 
demonstrates the increase in both countries welfare. 
This example serves to illustrate that trading opportunities 
depend upon the expected prices. 
1 2Before the transfer, a and a 
are linearly dependent and the trading opportunities are the same 
as they would be if no securities market existed. After the transfer, 
a1 and a2 are linearly independent and the trading opportunities 
are the same as they would be if a complete set of contingent claim 
markets existed at the beginning of the period. Thus, the transfer 
has the effect of opening a new market which completes the set of 
markets and the gains realized from trading wealth in state 1 for 
wealth in state 2 exceeds the losses due to the transfer. Prior to 
the transfer the home country would have liked to have traded some of 
its state 1 income for state 2 income but is unable to do so since 
a complete market equilibrium fails to exist. After the transfer, 
a complete market equilibrium does exist and the home country may 
now trade income in state 1 for income in state 2 (although to a lesser 
extent than it would have previously). The gains from doing so then result 
in more than offsetting the initial effect of the transfer. It should be 
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realized that this result is sensitive to the size of the transfer 
since it may be verified that if the home country transfers ten 
units of good one in state one then in the new equilibrium it will 
be worse off than it was prior to the transfer, while the welfare of 
the foreign country improves. 
This example does not appear in any way pathological and 
it is generally true that given the preferences and endowments of 
two countries, if the terms of trade shift as a result of a transfer, 
and if there exists a security structure such that before the transfer 
the securities are linearly dependent and after the transfer they 
become linearly independent, then there will exist some transfer 
such that the welfare of both countries is increased. 
Indeed, even if there exists as many securities as states, 
the existence of a complete market representation depends upon the 
prices which result. In fact, if the security structures reflect 
the terms of trade prior to the transfer, the vectors of monetary 
returns are always linearly dependent in the intial equilibrium. 
For example, if we had return structures represented by 
Al= 
[ -p (1) 
-p (2) :J and "=[: :]. 
we would define the monetary returns 
1
a. 
[-p (l)] 
- p (2) 
2
a. 
[ p (l)] 
.
p (2) 
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After the transfer if the terms of trade shift to p1 (s), s = 1,2, 
the m:>netary returns become 
1
a. 
[ p(l) ] 
p(2) 
and 2a. 
[p '(l)]
.
p I (2) 
Thus, if the transfer does not shift all prices proportionality, it 
will increase the number of linearly independent monetary returns, 
and thus is isomorphic to the opening of a new market. One caveat that 
must be noted here however is that unless the effect of the transfer 
is to open all markets, then we cannot be in general assured that it 
will be a Pareto improvement. In fact, if the markets remain 
incomplete, then both countries welfare may decrease (for an example 
of this see Hart [1975] and Bhattacharya [1979]). 
It should also be noted that Example 2 may also be used 
to illustrate a transfer which results in a Pareto inferior 
allocation. Namely, if we begin at the final equilibrium and 
transfer 5 units of good 1 from the foreign country to the home 
country, we will move to the initial equilibrium in that example. 
In this instance, the welfare of both countries is decreased. 
The second type of market structure we wish to examine is 
one in which the set of linearly independent securities remain the 
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same both before and after the transfer but there are fewer securities 
than states of nature. The following example examines the welfare 
effects in an economy with an incomplete set of security markets. It 
is well known that such security markets have multiple equilibria 
each possessing a distinct contingent claims representation. In 
this instance there may exist an equilibrium after the transfer that 
Pareto dominates the earlier (pre-transfer) equilibrium, as the 
following example demonstrates. 
Example 3 
Suppose now that there are three states of the world which 
may occur at the end of the period. The home country's preferences 
are represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
1 1 1/2 log x1 +log x2 and the foreign country's preferences are
represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
log xi + 1/2 log x�. Each country has the probability beliefs, 
1/3, 1/6, and 1/2 that states 1, 2 and 3 occur respectively, so 
that 
Ev
1
and 
EV
2
1 1 1 1 1/6 log x1(1) + 1/3 log x2(1) + 1/12 log x1(2) +1/6 log x2(2)
1 1 
+ 1/4 log x1(3) + 1/2 log x2(3)
2 2 2 2 1/3 log x1(1) + 1/6 log x2(1) + 1/6 log �(2) + 1/12 log x2(2)
2 2 
+ 1/2 log � (3) + 1/4 log x2(3).
22 
There are two securities available at the beginning of the period 
with return structures given by 
[ 1 0 l [ 19 0 ] 
Al = 
10 0 and A
2 = :6 952 
6 0 26 0 
1 The home country 's endowment vectors are w (1) = (90, 40)
1 1 w (2) = (90, 10) and w (3) (40, 20) and the foreign country's
2 2 2 are w (1) = (30, 80) w (2) (30, 110) and w (3) = (80, 100). We
will show that there is an equilibrium such that both countries 
can only trade income in state 1 for income in state 2. If this 
is the case then this is the equivalent of the existence of contingent 
claims markets for states 1 and 2 only. Thus, both countries maximize 
the expected utility of states 1 and 2 subject to a single budget 
constraint. 
maximizes, 
subject to 
That is, the home country 
1 1 1 1 1/6 log � (1) + 1/3 log x2(1) + 1/12 log �(2) + 1/6 log x2(2)
1 1 1 1 r1(l)x1 (1) + r2(l)x2(1) + r1 (2)x1(2) + r2(2)x2(2)
� 90r1(1) + 40r2(1) + 90r1(2) + 10r2(2)
1 1 
x (1), x (2) � 0
and the foreign country 
maximizes 
2 2 2 2 1/3 log x1(1)+1/6 log x2(1) + 1/6 log x1(2) + 1/12 log x2(2)
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subject to 2 2 2 2 r
1
(l)x1(1) + r2(l)x2(1) + r1(2)x1
(2) + r2(2)x2(2)
� 30r1(1) + 80r2(1) + 30r1(2) + 110r2(1)
2 2 x (1), x (2) � 0.
The equilibrium conditions are thus 
1 2 
�(s) + �(s) = 120 for h = 1, 2 and s =  1,2.
Since the utility functions of both countries are 1/3 of what they 
were in the first example, it is easily seen that this is the same 
problem as the before transfer case in that example. Thus, 
1 1 2 2 x (1) = x (2) = (40, 80), x (1) = x (2)
p(l) = p(2) = (1,1). 
For state 3, the home country 
maximizes 1 1 1/4 log x1(3) + 1/2 log x2(3)
(80, 40), and 
subject to p1(3)xi:(3) + p2(3)x�(3) � 40p1(3) + 20p2(3), x1(3) � O, 
and the foreign country 
maximizes 
subject to 
2 2 1/2 log x1 (3) + 
1/4 log x2(3)
2 2 2 p1(3)�(3) + p2(3)x2(3) � 80p1(3)+100p2(3), x (3) � o
where �(3) + �(3) = 120 for h = 1,2, in equilibrium. It may 
be verified that the solution to the problem is given by 
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1 200 1 2 1120 2 x1 (3) = ""lf"• x2(3) = SO, x1(3) = �· x2(3) = 70
8 p(3) = (1, 11 ).
Further1110re, these prices and consumption allocations may be 
shown to be an equilibrium to the economy with the two securities 
given above, where the equilibrium security holdings are 
1 32S 1 7S 2 32S 2 7S
zl = - 4• z2 = 4• zl = 4' z2 = -4
and the security prices are q1 = 6 and q2 = 26. Thus, in the equilibrium 
the utility levels of both countries are 
Ev1 = 1/2 (1/2 log 40 +log so) + 1/2 ( 1/2 log 21�0 + log so) = S.7943
and 
2 ( ) ( 1120 ) EV = 1/2 log 80 + 1/2 log 40 + 1/2 log� + 1/2 log 70 = 6.4869. 
As before, suppose the home country transfers S units of 
good one in state 1 to the foreign country. We now wish to show 
that there is an equilibrium such that both countries can only 
trade income in state 1 for income in state 3. Now both comi.tries 
maximize the expected utility of states 1 and 3 subject to a single 
budget constraint. The home country 
maximizes 1 1 1 1 1/6 log �(l) + 1/3 log x2(1) + 1/4 log x1(3) + 1/2 log x2(3)
2S 
subject to 1 1 r(l)x (1) + r(3)x (3) � 8Sr1 (1) + 40r2(1) + 40r1 (3) + 20r2(3)
1 1 x (1), x (3) > 0
Similarly the foreign country 
maximizes 
subject to 
2 2 2 2 1/3 log x1(1) +1/6 log x2(1) + 1/2 log �(3) + 1/4 log x2(3)
2 2 r(l)x (1) + r(3)x (3) 2_ 3Sr1(1) + 80r2(1) + 80r1(3) + 100r2(3)
2 2 x (1), x (3) � 0
where �(s) + �(s) = 120, for h = 1, 2, s = 1,3 in equilibrium. 
This equilibrium is given by 
1
(1) = 
1
(3) = 1440 
1
(1) = 1(3) = S760� � S3 ' x2 x2 89 
2 2 4920 2 2 4920 x
1(1) = �(3) = �· x2(1) = x2(3) =�· and
p(l) = p(3) 89 (l, 106 ).
For state 2, the home country 
maximizes 
subject to 
1 1 1/12 log x1(2) + 1/6 log x2(2)
1 1 1 pl (2)� (
2) + p2 (2)x2 (2) ;:> 90p1 (2) + 10p2 (2), x (2) � O,
and the foreign country 
maximizes 
subject to 
2 2 1/6 log x
1
(2) + 1/12 log x2(2)
2 2 2 p1(2)x1
(2) + p2(2)x2(2) � 30p1(2) + 110p2(2), x (2) � O.
2 6
Again, �(2) + �(2) 120, for h 1,2 in equilibrium. The equilibrium
is given by 
1 7 6 0  1 150 2 2000 2 1000 21 � (2) = D' x2(2) = ll' \ (2) = 23• x2(2) = 21"°"' p(2) = (1, TI). 
These prices and consumption allocations may also be shown 
to be an equilibrium to the economy with the two securities given 
above, where the equilibrium security holdings are 
1 zl 
5(14017) 
4 (53) 
1 
z2 
5(3275) 2 
4(53) ' zl 
5(14017) 2 
4(53) ' z2 
5 (3275) 
4 (53) 
d h • • I 10 d 214 an t e security prices are q1 = an q2 =.�5- In this equilibrium 
the utility levels of both countries are 
and 
EV2
EVl 5/6 [112 log 1�j0 +log 5��0 ] + l/6 [112 log 7263° +log 1�i0 ] 
5.8561. 
5/6 [1og 4;�o + 1/2 log 4��0] + 1/6 [1og 2��o + 1/2 log 1��0 ] 
6.5135, 
which Pareto dominates the equilibrium which we characterized before 
this transfer was made. Thus, the transfer acts as a vehicle through 
which, in an economy with an incomplete market structure, the welfare 
of both countries is improved. 
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Again a caveat is necessary. It has been demonstrated 
that there exists an equilibrium after a transfer which Pareto dominates 
an equilibrium attainable prior to the transfer. It should 
be noted here that such equilibria after transfer may indeed be 
Pareto inferior to some equilibria prior to the transfer. 
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the effect of a transfer when there 
are incomplete opportunities for risk sharing differs markedly from 
both the usual certainty case and the complete markets case. In 
particular, the transfer may increase or decrease the welfare of 
either country depending upon its effect on each country's 
opportunity set. In a sequel, we will examine opportunities for 
Pareto-improving transfer when production is included in this model. 
This will have the further effect that the returns on securities will 
become endogenous since by introducing a market for shares in 
firms will tie the return structure to each firm's profit structure. 
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Appendix 
We wish to evaluate the sign of the derivative in (4) to 
determine the effect of a transfer on the welfare of each country when 
the set of markets are complete. In this case, there are 2S goods, 
which in this section we will index by j = 1, . . •  ,2S. We will also 
need to examine the Jacobian of the market excess supply function 
in equilibrium which is defined by 
E(r) [ejk(r)] [aE. (r)J ark 
where E.(r) is the .market excess supply function for good j. Thus, 
J 
we have in equilibrium 
E. (r;�, M2)
J 
I<w� 
i J 
i xj) 0, j l, ... ,2S- l. (A.l) 
where, using Walras' law, we have omitted E25(r). From Slutsky's
equation we know that 
E(r) 
2 . 
- l Si(r) + 
i=l 
� i i i l I (r) • [x - w ] 
i=l 
(A.2) 
where the first term is the sum of positive definite matrices of 
substitution effects and the second term is the sum of income effects. 
Since, in equilibrium, x1 - w1 = w2 - x2, (A.2) may be written as
where 
E(r) 
S (r) 
1 1 I S(r) + I(r) • [x - w ] , 
2 . 
I Si(r) and I(r) 
i=l 
1 2 I (r) - I (r).
For future use, we state the following lemma: 
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� (Graybill [19 6 9j,Theorem .8.9.3) Since S(r) is nonsingular, then 
and 
det E(r) 
[E(r) ]-1
I I I 1 1 -1 !E(r) = S(r) (1 + [x - w ] ' • [S(r) ] • I(r))
� 1 1 ·� 
[S(r) ]-1 _ [S(r)] · "/(r)i[x - w ]'•jS(r) 
(l+[x - w ]' • [S(r) ] •I(r)) 
We may now proceed to demonstrate our proposition, namely 
(A.3) 
(A.4) 
Proposition: Consider an economy with a complete set of markets. If 
E(r) has a positive determinant in equilibrium then a transfer decreases 
the welfare of the transferor and increases the welfare of the 
transferee. 
Proof: From (4), we need to evaluate the sign of 
aEVi/a:>..l:>..=O 
i . i i µ {[wi - x ]  • [ar/a:>..] +I r.(s)t (s)} . 
i s 
(A.S) 
The change in the contingent claim prices as a result of the transfer, 
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[or/oA], is found by differentiating the system of excess supply 
functions, (A.l), to obtain 
(A.6) 
[aE .tar] · [ar/oA] + I ( aE� /aMi ) ( aMi /oA ) 0, j 1, ... , 2S - 1.
J i J 
where, Mi l Ari(s)t
i(s), is the amount of the transfer and
s 
_l '\' 1 2 2 oM""""/oA = L r1(s)t (s) and oM /oA s 
l r1 (s) t
2 (s)
s 
-I r1 (s)t
1(s)
s 
since t1(s) = -t2(s) < O. The system of equations, (A. 6), thus may
written in a matrix notation as 
E(r) • [ar/oA] { [aE1(r)/a�] - [oE2(r) /aMl} l r1 (s) t
1 (s)
s 
1 2 '\' 1 {I (r) - I (r)} l r1 (s)t (s)s 
I(r) l r1 (s)t
1(s)
s 
(A. 7) 
since oEi(r)/oMi may be seen to be the change in country i's demands
as its income, µi, varies. Solving (A.7) for [or/oA] and substituting
into (A.5) yields 
oEVi/aA\A=O 
. 1 . . ' 1 µ1L r1(s)t (s) {[w1 - x1] • [E(r)]
- • I(r) + l} 
s 
Since µi, the marginal utility of income, is positive and the transfer, ti(s),
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is negative in each state, the qualitative effect of the transfer on 
country i's welfare will be of opposite sign of the expression 
within the braces. To evaluate this expression we use (A.4) from the 
above ·1emma to show that for the home country 
1 1 ' -1 [w - x ] • [E(r)] • I(r) + 1 
which, by (A.3) of the lemma becomes 
1 1 ' -1 [w - x ] • [E (r)} • I(r) + 1
1 1 ' -1 -1 {l + (x - w )  • [S(r)] • I(r)} 
\S(r)\/\E(r)\. (A.8) 
The reader may verify that for the foreign country, this expression 
is of opposite sign. Thus, since S(r) is positive definite, we know 
that \S(r)\ > 0 and since by assumption \E(r)\ > O, then the welfare 
of the transferor has decreased and the welfare of the transferee has 
increased. 
In conclusion, we should also note that this is exactly 
the condition used by Varian [1975] to show the uniqueness of an 
equilibrium in a pure exchange economy. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Keynes [1929] makes this presumption. On the other hand, Samuelson
[1952] concludes that there should be presumption on how the terms
of trade should change. However, in a second paper, Samuelson
[1954] shows how Keynes' presumption could be restored when certain
trade impediments are introduced.
2. See Caves and Jones [1977], pages 45 6- 6 0.
3-. Hart [1975, p. 442] gives an example of a Pareto-improving 
transfer. However, in his model there are three trading periods 
with uncertainty entering only in the final period. Further, he. 
requires that one of the goods does not enter one of the country 's 
utility functions. 
4. When the set of markets are complete, it follows that, for each
s = l, . • •  ,S, there exists a set of scalars q(s) such that 
r1 (s) = q(s)p1(s) and r2(s) = q(s)p2(s). (For a proof of a
more general result see Radner - [1972] .)
5. For a survey of this approach, see Grandmont [1977].
6 .  This is the approach adopted by Bhattacharya [1979], Fries [1979] 
and Hart [1975] , which we will continue here. 
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